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This thesis examines geographic bachelorhood among Marines assigned to 
various bases and the role of school quality on the decision to pursue geographic 
bachelorhood. In particular, it estimates the effect of having school-age children on the 
probability of geographic bachelorhood when Marines are assigned to Jacksonville, 
North Carolina; Albany, Georgia; Twentynine Palms, California; and Hawaii—areas 
perceived as having under-performing K-12 schools. The thesis further analyzes the 
effects of having school-age children on whether Marines establish households within the 
school district boundaries of these locations.   
Employing logit regression analysis and using data from the Total Forces Data 
Warehouse, I find that Marines with school-age children exhibit higher odds of choosing 
to be geographic bachelors in all locations studied; however, Marines with school-age 
children assigned to Albany exhibit the greatest odds of choosing geographic 
bachelorhood. These findings hold even controlling for demographic characteristics such 
as years of service and ethnicity. There is also variation in the likelihood of geographic 
bachelorhood by school age–specific factors; having secondary school-age children is 
most highly associated with geographic bachelorhood relative to primary and middle 
school–age children. I recommend conducting similar analyses with additional variables 
gathered through surveys, as well as within-state comparisons for each location and 
analyses that include other bases for comparison.   
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According to a 2015 survey conducted by school liaisons for the Marine and 
Family Programs office of Headquarters Marine Corps, four Marine Corps bases are 
perceived to have poor education opportunities for dependent children. The locations of 
these bases are Jacksonville, North Carolina; Albany, Georgia; Twentynine Palms, 
California; and Honolulu (Kaneohe Bay), Hawaii. This thesis attempts to identify if the 
perceived school quality near these installations has an impact on a family’s decision to 
live apart from one another; it explores the role of education opportunities on family 
relocation choices.   
A. BACKGROUND 
The Marine Corps’ school liaison field receives informal feedback from the 
military families they serve on a regular basis. According to the results of a 2015 School 
Liaison Program survey, the main factors that influence a family’s relocation decisions 
are quality of education and proximity to the installation. As indicated previously, this 
survey also reveals that four specific installations are perceived to have lower-quality 
education programs. Several families indicate that they were reluctant to move to these 
locations due to the reputed underperformance of the areas’ schools. When families 
choose to reside separately, the dependents remain in place while the Marine executes 
his/her orders unaccompanied; they are then considered to be geographical bachelors, or 
“geo-bachelors.”   
The Department of Defense (DOD) has multiple programs dedicated to the 
education of military children. They operate schools in nine U.S. states (including Guam 
and Puerto Rico) and provide subsidies to other areas that serve a large population of 
military children. Of the four locations previously identified, only one of them 
(Jacksonville, North Carolina) offers on-base DOD schooling. In the Jacksonville area, 
there are actually seven DOD schools that serve students who reside on-base. Of these 
seven schools, one is a high school, one is a middle school, and the remaining five are 
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elementary schools. For dependents who reside off-base and for those who are assigned 
to areas without DOD schools, the local public school system is available for enrollment.     
Jacksonville families that reside off-base attend Onslow County schools. Onslow 
County offers 21 elementary/primary schools, eight middle schools, and seven 
high/secondary schools. Families assigned to Albany, Georgia attend schools within 
Dougherty, Worth, and Lee Counties. Among these counties are 22 primary/elementary 
schools, eight middle schools, and seven high schools. In Twentynine Palms, California, 
families fall within the Morongo Unified School District. This school district has 11 
primary/elementary schools, two middle schools, and three high schools. For those 
assigned to Marine Corps Base Hawaii, most children attend schools in the Honolulu 
district. Honolulu offers 37 primary/elementary schools, 10 middle schools, and seven 
high schools.   
In general, a military family’s school decision, regardless of installation 
assignment, may be categorized into four main choices: reside separately from the service 
member in order to remain in a school district of choice, pay tuition and enroll in a good-
quality private school at the new location, homeschool the child/children, or enroll in the 
new installation’s public school system. Each of these choices comes at a cost which 
changes based on location. For instance, if the local public schools are considered to be 
of high quality, the cost associated with enrolling in that school is low; if they are 
considered poor quality, the cost is high.    
An abundance of research regrading school choice and school quality exists, but 
no reports or papers strictly concerning school choice and the Marine Corps have been 
identified in the literature. General arguments about choice theory and what constitutes a 
good quality school are the building blocks used in this thesis.    
B. IMPORTANCE 
As an all-volunteer force, the military is constantly researching ways to recruit 
high-quality personnel and increase retention. One factor that greatly impacts Marines’ 
retention decisions is their quality of life. Quality of life for service members and their 
families is a great consideration as its effects can range from general health and well-
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being to retention. Awareness of quality of life impacts has grown dramatically in the 
past decade, resulting in an increase of services offered to military members as well as 
their families. It is important to understand that each installation’s needs are different and 
proper evaluation of what those needs are is necessary in order to appropriately allocate 
available resources.   
Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) is available to support Marines and 
their families through various programs. The categories of services/programs that MCCS 
provides are: activities, fitness, benefits, career, lodging, recreation, relationships, 
retail, dining, education, support, and family (which includes school liaison) (MCCS 
Forward, n.d.). In Marine Corps Order 5400.54 of 19 Apr 2013, all Installation 
Commanders are ordered to “champion the appropriate allocation of all available 
resources to support the MCCS program across the entire enterprise” (p. 2, Enclosure 2). 
Therefore, the commanders must be made aware of quality of life issues in order to 
understand what the needs are within the community.   
C. SCOPE 
This thesis addresses two research questions, the first being: Of those assigned to 
bases with a reputation for low-quality public K-12 schools, how likely is it that Marines 
with school-age children choose to become geo-bachelors? The second research question 
is: To what extent does surrounding school quality affect Marines’ choices to live within 
the school district boundaries of Jacksonville, Albany, Twentynine Palms, and Marine 
Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH)? Considering these questions, the scope of this thesis is 
restricted to active duty Marines who have been assigned to any of these four locations 
between October, 2011 and September, 2016.   
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
To answer the first research question, logit regression models are estimated and 
reveal that there is a positive relationship between having school-age children and the 
likelihood of being a geographic bachelor in the areas of interest. In this dataset, geo-
bachelors represent 24.81 percent of Marines married to dependent spouses. The 
estimates also reveal that the greatest positive effects are associated with Marines who 
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have at least one secondary school-age child. Specifically, the odds of becoming a 
geographic bachelor are respectively 43.2 and 40 percent less likely if a Marine has at 
least one elementary or middle school-age child, compared to having at least one 
secondary school-age child, all else constant. Marines assigned to Albany, Georgia are 
1.87 times more likely to become geo-bachelors than those assigned to Camp LeJeune 
and exhibit the greatest likely of choosing geographic bachelorhood. Of the four 
locations, Marines assigned to Camp LeJeune/Jacksonville, North Carolina are the least 
likely to become geographic bachelors. 
Analysis involving school district boundaries demonstrate a similar positive 
relationship between the existence of school-age children and the likelihood of living 
within the assigned location’s school district boundaries. In this dataset, 76.66 percent of 
Marines with at least one school-age child live within their respective school-district 
boundaries. Of all the locations, the area exhibiting the greatest positive effect is Camp 
LeJeune/Jacksonville, North Carolina where Marines with school-age children are 2.54 
times more likely to live within the boundaries than those without, all else held constant. 
The area observed to have the least positive relationship between presence of school-age 
children and living within the boundary is Hawaii where Marines with school-age 
children are 1.82 times more likely to live within the school district boundary than 
Marines without school-age children, all else constant.  
Results relating to research question two also indicate a significant positive 
correlation between being identified as black and the likelihood of living within the 
Albany school district boundaries. Regression estimates reveal that black Marines 
assigned to Albany are 1.9 times more likely than white Marines to live within the school 
district boundaries, all else equal.  This correlation is significant and negative for all other 
locations.    
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study should be expanded to include other base locations that have a less 
negative perception of K-12 school options. Expansion of this study should also include 
within-state comparisons for each location to either refute or confirm the perceptions of 
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under-performance. Access to complete dependent residence zip codes would permit 
analysis using geographic information systems models, offering more thorough analysis 
of the geographic relationships between dependents and bases or spouse. Future studies 
relating to this topic should include data from Marine Corps-wide surveys that are well-
designed with the intent to answer questions associated with co-location decisions and 
school choice options. Additionally, school liaison offices should be utilized to keep track 
of all military-affiliated dependents’ school enrollment. This can be accomplished by 
mandating all personnel to visit the school liaison upon check in/out and ensuring liaisons 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. DECISION MAKING  
1. Tiebout Model 
In his 1956 article “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Charles M. Tiebout 
formalizes how one might achieve efficient provision of public goods even when the 
free-rider problem exists. The theory revolves around optimizing the allocation of taxes 
in such a way that ensures public goods expenditures accurately reflect the population’s 
preferences. Public goods are non-excludable goods available for collective consumption 
which can be consumed by one individual without subtracting its availability to other 
individuals (Tiebout, 1956, p. 416). Tiebout believes that facilities and services such as 
schools, municipal golf courses, beaches, parks, police protection, roads, and parking 
facilities are considered public goods.   
In Tiebout’s (1956) framework, areas with many, small local governments can be 
viewed as a decentralized pricing system in which “the revenue and expenditure patterns 
are more or less set” (p. 418), and the consumer-voter can then choose to shop around 
and reside wherever his preferences are best satisfied. However, Tiebout’s local 
government model (commonly referred to as “voting with one’s feet”) includes seven 
important assumptions. The assumptions are: (1) Consumer-voters must be fully able and 
willing to move into those communities which best satisfy their preference patterns; (2) 
Consumer-voters have full knowledge of “menus” for the various tax/service 
combinations available and that they react to these differences; (3) There are many 
communities to choose from; (4) There are no restrictions on mobility due to employment 
(income is independent of choice); (5) There are no spillovers of benefits or taxes from 
other communities; (6) A restraint exists in the form of fixed factors or resources which 
generate optimal community sizes; and (7) Communities will take appropriate action to 
gain or maintain their optimal size in order to ensure the lowest average costs. 
If these assumptions are met, Tiebout’s model can be compared to private markets 
by visualizing one consumer walking to a private establishment to buy goods at a set 
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price, and another consumer walking to a community or neighborhood where the prices 
(taxes) of the services provided in that community are set (Tiebout, 1956, p. 422). They 
have each made a choice based on their preferences. As Tiebout says in his conclusion, 
“If consumer-voters are fully mobile, the appropriate local governments … are adopted 
by the consumer-voters” (1956, p. 424). Under Tiebout’s assumptions, people 
intentionally select a local government based on its set revenue-expenditure patterns. 
2. What Constitutes a “Good-Quality” School   
Choosing the right school is important to parents because it is a human capital 
investment in which the children and parents stand to benefit. This choice can be thought 
of as a utility maximization decision where school quality is the utility-producing good 
(Chakrabarti & Roy, 2010). When it comes to defining exactly what it is that makes a 
good-quality school, however, perceptions seem abstract and opinions vary greatly.   
In the academic research literature, school quality measures abound and are split 
into two general categories: input- and output-based. Equation 1 shows the education 
production function and demonstrates that output measures are essentially a function of 
the input measures.   
 
 1
( , , , )t t t t tY f S F P Y −=  (1) 
The outputs (Yt) are variables such as academic test scores, graduation rates, and 
rates of college attendance; output measures are typically quantifiable and 
straightforward. Input measures, on the other hand, include a variety of things which may 
be quantitative or qualitative. Input variables include school resources (St) such as the 
number of computers, student to teacher ratios, teacher quality/experience, facilities, and 
overall per-pupil expenditure. They also include family characteristics (Ft) such as 
parents’ education, income, degree of involvement, and race/ethnicity, as well as peer 
characteristics (Pt) like friends’ test scores or extracurricular activities. The final input 
variable represents the last year’s (t-1) academic/education output (Yt-1) as a baseline 
input into this t year’s education production output.   
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In 2000, the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reported a similar 
relationship between student learning/achievement and various input measures. The 
NCES identified three critical areas they consider to be primary contributors to students’ 
overall learning and the overall quality of a school. These areas are “the training and 
talent of the teaching force [teachers], what goes on in the classrooms [classrooms], and 
the overall culture and atmosphere of the school [school context]” (Mayer, Mullens, & 
Moore, 2000, p. i). The NCES further reports that these three areas contain 13 school 
quality indicators that directly and indirectly affect student learning (see Figure 1). The 
report confidently presents these indicators, but also clearly states that “the link between 
learning and these factors is not firmly established for all of these indicators” (p. ii), and 
more precise measures are needed. 
Figure 1.  School Quality Indicators and Their Relationship to Student 
Learning. Source: Mayer et al. (2000). 
 
Not everyone agrees on the accuracy or importance of certain school quality 
measures. Wells and Crain (as cited in Miamidian [2011]) argue that output measures 
such as the rate of college attendance are problematic because they have more to do with 
the family’s wealth and background than the quality of a school. Also, Boyd, Grossman, 
Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2005), Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2006) each reveal that 
assessments of teacher credential and training contributions to student achievement are 
inconsistent, making it difficult to link these input measures to outputs.   
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Policy makers tend to focus on the impact that school resources have on academic 
achievement; however, as early as 1966 with the publication of the Coleman Report, 
researchers have recognized the pitfalls of placing too much emphasis on school 
resources as a measure of school quality (Coleman et al., 1966). According to the 
Coleman Report (1966), the greatest differences in segregated schools were the 
educational backgrounds of fellow students. While student achievement differed greatly 
between segregated schools, the facilities and curriculum were quite similar, indicating 
that school resources have less of an effect on student achievement than peer-group 
characteristics. Hoxby (2003) also expresses how school quality is in part determined by 
the abilities of its student body. She claims that the peer-group effects of higher-ability 
students dramatically raise school quality. In the 1960s, desegregation laws were created 
to combat the ability-driven differences and achieve greater equality in educational 
opportunities. However, studies show that own-race preferences are still present and may 
contribute greatly to a parent’s school choice decision (Lankford & Wyckoff, 2000; 
Saporito & Lareau, 1999; Weiher & Tedin, 2002; Hastings, Kane, & Staiger, 2005).    
Although survey results within the parental choice literature consistently indicate 
that parents are indifferent to demographic composition and do not exhibit preference 
towards student demographics (Chakrabarti & Roy, 2010), their observed behavior 
reveals otherwise. According to Elacqua, Schneider, and Buckley (2006), 87 percent of 
parents in their sample sorted across schools based on parent education and socio-
economic status measures and they only considered schools that had similar 
demographics to their own. More specifically, race has been a consideration for parents. 
Schneider and Buckley (2002) find that in general, parents (regardless of race) seek 
schools with fewer black students. Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2005) also find that 
school test scores are less of a predictor of school choice than the percentage of black 
students.   
Finally, it can be argued that student body demographics are strongly correlated 
with the school’s location. Saporito and Lareau (1999) study the importance of location 
on school choice and find that both whites and blacks prefer schools closer to their 
homes; however, they also note that whites are typically willing to travel further in order 
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to attend schools meeting other preferred characteristics (such as higher proportions of 
white students). Similarly, Glazerman (1998) finds that parents place a relatively low 
value on location with only 26 percent of his sample choosing the school closest to their 
home.   
3. How Might Parents Decide? 
Proximity may be a weighty consideration for many parents making school choice 
decisions, but do they choose schools based on local-level expenditures as Tiebout’s 
(1956) “voting with one’s feet” model suggests? Hoxby (2003) explains that today’s 
neighborhood designs present limitations to Tiebout’s model. Many counties within the 
United States are geographically large and contain multi-school districts. Additionally, 
many states have been leaning towards reforms aimed to equalize expenditure in 
educational finance. Within a given county, variation in school quality is likely to exist 
but it can no longer be attributed to community-level politics as Tiebout suggests. Parents 
are now choosing between neighborhoods that share resources and seem to be making 
their school choice decisions based on factors other than expenditure.   
If local community finances are less of a consideration, how do parents sort the 
multiple, often subjective, school quality measures in order to effectively evaluate 
schools and make the best decision regarding where their children should be educated? 
One theory regarding decision-making in general is the rational choice theory. This 
approach to explaining the process of making decisions is empirically focused and 
predictive in nature. When it comes to school choice, Miamidian (2011) presents the idea 
of an educational marketplace in which parents are free to leave a school they are 
dissatisfied with and search for one that better fits their educational needs. This implies 
that parents are rational beings who identify their own personal needs and make 
calculated decisions based on the degree of fulfillment expected. A rational man making 
economic decisions is explained further by economist Herbert Simon (as cited in 
Miamidian [2011]); he writes,  
This man is assumed to have knowledge of… relevant aspects of his 
environment… He is assumed also to have a well-organized and stable 
system of preferences, and a skill in computation that enables him to 
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calculate, for the alternative course of action [i.e., decisions]… available 
to him, which of these [decisions] will permit him to reach the highest 
point on his preference scale. (p. 104)   
Using the rational choice theory to evaluate parents’ school-choice decisions 
implies that families would essentially rank the most desired features of a school in order 
of importance to them. Once the rankings are set, they would then select the school that 
best satisfies the greatest number of these desired features, a sort of process of 
elimination.  
This is similar to the utility-maximization paradigm, as Chakrabarti and Roy 
(2010) explain and as laid out in Tiebout’s model. As a consumer, families (parents) 
make decisions regarding the distribution of their wealth or resources. Along with other 
goods, school quality yields a certain amount of utility that the family will try to 
maximize given their limited resources. Schools are characterized by quality measures 
such as academic achievement, student to teacher ratios, school demographics, and/or 
location, which all come at a price. The costs associated with school quality can take the 
form of private school tuition, or can be thought of in terms of opportunity costs for 
tuition-free public schools. Every family has a different utility function or set of 
preferences. Families that place a stronger value on school quality will be more likely to 
sacrifice other expenses in order to attain it.     
While the rational choice theory seems rather straightforward, it has limitations 
preventing a thorough explanation about how a parent’s decisions are made. The rational 
choice theory fails to consider external influences that greatly effect decision making. As 
Miamidian (2011) says, “External social and cultural influences exert varying levels of 
constraint upon different families making these decisions” (p. 29). Additionally, this 
theory assumes that parents will have access to information for every school available 
and they will be equally effective in assessing each school’s features.  
In addition to what the utility-maximization function suggests, Bulman (2004) 
explains that the process of selecting a school is different than the process of selecting 
any other consumable good. When assessing schools, many issues other than school 
quality measures are considered. According to Bulman (2004) there are a number of 
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additional factors that may influence families facing school choice decisions. He suggests 
that “parents draw heavily upon the tools of their past educational experiences (and often 
religious faith) as they interpret the educational world and take action within it” (Bulman, 
2014, p. 494) and emphasizes the importance of considering cultural aspects when 
studying school-choice. 
Considering cultural and social influences as additional factors effecting school 
choice decisions also implies that there may be variations in the way racial groups make 
these choices. Studies presented in Miamidian’s (2011) dissertation indicate that white 
families tend to immediately eliminate schools that have predominantly African 
American students, no matter how many positive features the school might have. This 
same study also revealed that African American parents may avoid schools that have 
large numbers of poor children in the student body, regardless of other features. This is 
also represented by Holme (2002) when she says that “white, upper-income parents often 
choose schools that tend to be whiter and wealthier” (p. 182) and “parents of color tend to 
choose schools where their children are better represented” (p. 182). These findings 
demonstrate that the parents’ race often has an impact on the school choice decision-
making process they undergo. 
Social networks arguably play an even larger role than race in the choices parents 
make (but the two may be considered as highly correlated). For parents in the decision 
making process, information received through social networks is often weighted heavier 
than any other factor. Holme’s (2002) research reveals that “most parents […] based their 
judgements about the school quality primarily on information from individuals in their 
social networks” (p. 180). She goes on further to say that the information provided did 
not even include standard quality measures such as curricula or instructional quality. 
Another article by Petronio (1996) uses survey results to support this by saying “Rather 
than quantitative data (test scores) on school performance, parents wanted answers to two 
questions: Is it a good school? Are the teachers good? For that information, parents 
turned to their friends and neighbors” (p. 33).  
Often times, a school choice decision manifests itself in a residential choice 
decision. In 1995, the NCES indicated that “47 percent of parents with children attending 
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grades 3 through 12 in 1993 reported that their choice of where they lived now was 
influenced by where their child would attend school” (Pfeiffer, 2008, p. 11). While this 
does not represent a majority, it is significant and worthy of exploration.   
If a significant number of families’ residential decisions are based on school 
preferences, how much would they be willing to pay in order to go to a good school?  
Black’s (1999) report addresses this very question regarding the value of good schools. In 
her study, Black (1999) uses a hedonic regression to examine the relationship between 
school quality and house prices in a unique and well-defined way. Black (1999) was not 
the first to attempt this type of analysis; however, previous research was biased due to 
omitted variables and the overall methodology needed revision.     
According to Black (1999), there were two types of omitted variable problems in 
previous research. The first problem regarded omitted variables such as property tax rates 
and public goods provision at the school district level (Tiebout model considerations). 
The second issue with previous analysis was that there were omitted variables such as 
neighborhood characteristics, which could change over space (Black, 1999). To address 
these omitted variable problems, Black’s (1999) methodology includes a “full set of 
boundary dummies that indicate houses that share (on either side) an attendance district 
boundary” (p. 579). Including these dummies ensures that the unobserved characteristics 
shared by houses on either side of the boundary are accounted for. The comparison 
occurs among houses that are within close proximity to each other but belong to different 
school districts due to the boundaries set by the city/state. The resulting equation is: 
 'ln( ) aiab iab b iabprice K testa c b θ γ e= + + + +   (2) 
Where priceiab is the cost of house i in attendance district a close to boundary b, and Kb is 
a vector of boundary dummies.  
Black’s (1999) main finding from Equation (2) indicates that parents are “willing 
to pay about 2.1 percent—or $3948—more for houses associated with test scores that are 
5 percent higher at the mean” (p. 595). This implies that parents are not the only ones 
concerned with the value of better schools; it extends to other home owners in the 
community and even local politicians. While this analysis is able to put a price tag on 
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school quality, it still fails to address what it is that causes the schools to achieve different 
test scores. The question remains: is the quality of a school attributed to better teachers, 
administrators, peers, or parents? Or is it something else entirely?   
B. MILITARY FAMILIES  
In military families, there are unique factors that influence a parent’s school 
choice decisions.  Service members are forced to take assignments in given areas which 
diminishes their ability to “vote with one’s feet”, as in Tiebout’s (1956) local government 
model.  The margin along which they can vote with their feet is by choosing to be 
geographic bachelors and reside separately from their family. Military families are also 
special in that they tend to form symbiotic networks, so they may rely effectively on their 
networks to answer questions about local schools when transitioning to a new location.    
Additionally, military members receive a rank-based monthly allowance for housing.  For 
some families, their residential decision may be influenced by this housing allowance 
alone as opposed to school selection considerations.   
1. Quality of Life  
According to the June 2015 Marine Corps Demographics Update, nearly 185,000 
active duty Marines served in the Marine Corps. Of these active duty members, 44.9 
percent were married, bringing over 75,000 spouses into the Corps and almost 100,000 
children. Single Marines contribute to the number of dependents as well, accounting for 
nearly 6,500 children. Although the ages of dependent children range from infant to 19 
years, the largest of the defined age groups is identified as school-age (5–12). This group 






Figure 2.  Number of Marine Corps Children. Source: Headquarters Marine 
Corps, Marine & Family Programs (2015). 
 
Although the Marine Corps has the smallest percentage of married members when 
compared to other branches of service, married Marines still represent a large portion of 
the Corps and families are important to the institution as a whole. Often times, retention 
decisions of married Marines are based on the quality of life experienced by the spouse or 
family. An entire chapter is dedicated to the value of quality of life programs in the 
Department of Defense’s Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, 
demonstrating the significance families have on recruitment, retention, and overall 
readiness. A 2013 RAND report also recognizes the importance of families, saying that 
“the success of an all-volunteer force depends on the satisfaction, health, and well-being 
of service members and their families” (Meadows, Miller, Miles, Gonzalez, & Dues, 
p. 16). 
2. Schools 
Among a list of factors that contribute to a spouse’s or family member’s quality of 
life is the quality of the local schools available to them. According to the Department of 
Defense (DOD) (2008), “Maintaining quality education and smooth transitions for 
[military members’] children is a critical priority for military parents and a goal shared by 
DOD” (p. 136). The DOD’s contribution to military children’s education is categorized 
into three different programs. One program is dedicated to schools overseas (Department 
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of Defense Dependent Schools—DODS), another is specific to the Continental United 
States (Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools - DDESS). DDESS 
schools currently operate on select bases in Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, New York, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Guam, and Puerto Rico.  A third program uses 
the Department of Education to subsidize local public schools that serve a large 
population of military dependents (Impact Aid).   
The Military Impacted Schools Association reported that over $1.2 billion was 
appropriated to qualifying schools through Impact Aid in 2015. According to the DOD 
Education Activity’s Report to Congress (2015), a total of 573,057 military dependents 
attended non-DOD schools. This equates to roughly $2,250 per pupil in Impact Aid 
appropriations. Impact Aid is available to all U.S. school districts that have at least 400 
federal students or have a federally-connected student population of at least 3 percent. 
Impact Aid is given to the school district and may not necessarily impact the specific 
school that these children attend.  
Although a majority of military children attend public or private schools off-base, 
there are often on-base options such as DOD schools, non-DOD public schools, and 
public charter schools. The interest in offering charter schools as an on-base option has 
grown rapidly in military families as there are some installations known for having 
underperforming local public schools. The 2013 Charter Schools report conducted by the 
GAO (Scott, Doughty, Baxter, Bodine, & Signer, 2013) finds that there are already eight 
charter schools operating on military bases (most of these are located on Air Force 
bases). Although the population of on-base residents is predominantly military, 
enrollment is open to non-military children and off-base residents as well. Considering 
that there are only a few domestic geographic locations where DOD schools operate, 
allowing bases to incorporate charter schools could provide families with greater choices 




The study of school choice or school quality measures traverses multiple 
disciplines. Regardless of the primary focus or overall outcomes of these studies, parents 
make school choice decisions based on their own personal methods. Whether driven by 
emotion, logic, or social influence, a parent will demonstrate satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with their child’s school by choosing to remain where they are, enrolling 
in a different school within the same district, or relocating to a different school district. 
Military families also make school choice decisions for their children, but they are 
often faced with fewer choices because of where they are stationed. While the DOD has 
programs dedicated to the education of military children, there are only nine states in the 
United States that offer DDES schools. The school choice limitations that military 
families often face may force them to choose between settling on a school they believe to 
be unsatisfactory, or residing separately from their military spouse in order to stay in a 
good school district.   
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA SOURCE 
Data used in this study is drawn from the Total Forces Data Warehouse (TFDW). 
The TFDW houses data from other systems including Marine Corps Total Force System, 
which is the primary source for the personnel information used in this thesis. Data 
provided by TFDW consist of personnel and demographic information for Marines and 
family members assigned to Jacksonville, North Carolina; Albany, Georgia; Twentynine 
Palms, California; and Honolulu (Kaneohe Bay), Hawaii between October, 2011 and 
September, 2016. The original data set includes 77 variables and 332,334 observations 
sorted by an electronic interchange person identifier and record identifier.   
B. DATA CLEANING      
Many observations in the raw data provided by TFDW contain duplicate family 
member information that must be addressed. Upon identifying and dropping duplicates, 
the data consists of 293,103 unique observations. At this point, each family member 
shares an electronic ID with their sponsor and is considered an individual observation. 
Collapsing the data by electronic ID prior to conducting analysis allows one observation 
to represent an entire family when appropriate. This results in 169,346 unique 
observations representing a single Marine or a Marine and his or her family. Single 
Marines with school-age dependents represent 1,115 of these observations.    
C. VARIABLES 






Table 1.   Description of Variables 
 
Variable Name Description
SchoolAge Dependents age 5-18 [0,1]
Num_SchoolAge Total number of School Age Depn
Elementary Dependents age 5-10 [0,1]
Num_Elementary Total number of Primary Age Depn
Middle Dependents age 11-14 [0,1]
Num_Middle Total number of Middle School Depn
Secondary Dependents age 15-18 [0,1]
Num_Secondary Total number of High School Depn
BASE Assigned base (Albany, Camp Lej, 29Palms, Hawaii)
Albany Assigned to Albany
Camp_LeJenue Assigned to Camp LeJeune/Jacksonville
TwentyPalms Assigned to 29Palms
Hawaii Assigned to Hawaii
In_Albany Dependents living within Albany School District
In_Camp_LeJeune Dependents living within Camp LeJeune School District
In_TwentyPalms Dependents living within 29Palms School District
In_Hawaii Dependents living within Honolulu School District






Married_Depn Civilian Spouse [0,1]
Married_Mil Service Member Spouse [0,1]
Married Married [0,1]
Pres_Grade Grade at time of assignment
Edu Highest Grade (12, College, Bachelors, Masters, Beyond)
X_EDU Missing civilian education [0,1]
Co_Loc Family co-located [0,1]
Geobach Geographic bachelor [0,1]
Geobach2 Geographic bachelor [0,1] all married Marines
YearsSvc Years of service at assignment
X_SERVICE Missing years of service [0,1]
electronic_identification Electronic ID
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1. Dependent Variables 
a. Geographic Bachelor (GEOBACH) 
According to the United States Marine Corps (2009), a geographic bachelor is a 
“service member … authorized to be accompanied by dependents … who for personal 
reasons other than availability of housing at the permanent duty location, is not 
accompanied by dependents” (p. 2-61). To construct a variable for identifying geographic 
bachelors, it is necessary to create a binary co-location variable by assigning “1” to the 
observations in which the dependent’s three-digit geographic location code matches the 
service member’s geographic location code or the dependent’s location (CITY, ST) 
matches the service member’s location.   
For co-location identification only it is necessary to modify some of the 
dependent’s location and geographic location codes. Areas in the vicinity of the four 
assignment locations can be named differently. For example, dependent locations of 
“JOSHUA TREE, CA” are actually in “TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA.” To make the 
coding consistent and identify geographic bachelors, I replace dependent geographic 
codes of “316, 398, or 315,” with “317” to indicate that they are either contiguous or 
located within a reasonable commuting distance to Albany, GA. Likewise, I replace 
dependent geographic codes of “923, 924, 917, 935, and 925” with “922” for Twentynine 
Palms, CA. I replace those with codes of “967” with “968” for Hawaii and “284” with 
“285” for Jacksonville, NC. Similarly, in order to generate the best co-location variable I 
replace some of the dependent locations as well. I change dependent locations that read 
“SNEADS FERRY, NC” or “CAMP LEJENUE, NC” to “JACKSONVILLE, NC” since 
service members assigned to installations in Jacksonville or Camp Lejeune indicate 
“JACKSONVILLE, NC” as their location. Likewise, I change dependent locations of 
“JOSHUA TREE, CA” and “YUCCA VALLEY, CA” to “TWENTYNINE PALMS, 
CA.” Hawaii is a unique location in which dependents residing anywhere on the island 
are considered to be co-located if their sponsor is assigned to Hawaii; therefore, I replace 
all on-island dependent locations with “HAWAII”.   
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It is important to include both dependent location and geographic location for 
generating the co-location variable because some of the observations contain conflicting 
data in which the geographic code is missing or represents a different state than the 
location reported, even after modifications. Using both of these expressions ensures that 
at least one match will produce a “1” for the co-location variable, resulting in the most 
comprehensive and conservative way to identify geographic bachelors. 
The second variable that is used to identify geographic bachelors is 
“Married_Depn”. The married dependent variable identifies Marines who are married to 
civilians and is combined with co-location to represent those who are married to a 
dependent but are not co-located (Married_Depn==1 & Co_Loc==0). Dual service-
member couples are not included in this variable because there are unique service-driven 
factors that could cause them to reside separately from one another. Additionally, they 
cannot claim one another as a dependent, which is necessary to be considered a 
geographic bachelor. To demonstrate differences when they are included, I also create 
GEOBACH2, which is GEOBACH as described previously including dual-service 
couples. Table 2 shows the number of Marines married to dependents or service 
members, as well as the number of GEOBACH and GEOBACH2 observations.  
Table 2.   Summary of Married and Geo-bachelor Status 
Variable Frequency Percent 
Married_Depn 46623 27.6 
Married_Mil 5039 3.0 
GEOBACH 11565 6.8 
GEOBACH2 13272 7.8 
 
b. Boundaries 
Each installation’s school liaison website provides information regarding local 
school districts. The school districts are identified by counties and include multiple 
communities within the surrounding area. The most preferred method for determining 
whether or not family members reside within the installation’s school district boundaries 
 23 
is to use the designated residential zip code and match it with those inside the district. 
Unfortunately, zip code data for dependents is limited to the first three digits, and as 
previously mentioned, often conflicts with the reported location variable. In order to 
create the most conservative boundary variables, a combination of matching codes or 
locations is used. The geographic codes and locations used in the generation of the new 
boundary variables are unmodified.   
There are four boundary variables used to represent the locations of interest. The 
variable In_Camp_LeJeune identifies anyone who has either the dependent geographic 
location code of “285,” a dependent location of “JACKSONVILLE, NC.” or dependent 
location “CAMP LEJENUE, NC.” The variable In_Albany identifies anyone who has the 
dependent geographic location code “317” or dependent location “ALBANY, GA.” 
In_TwentyPalms identifies those with dependent geographic location code “922”, or 
dependent locations “TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA. JOSHUA TREE, CA; or YUCCA 
VALLEY, CA.” In_Hawaii represents those with dependent geographic codes “966, 968, 
or 967” or dependent locations “HONOLULU, HI or PEARL HARBOR, HI.” The 
locations chosen for inclusion are within the given installation school district boundaries.  
2. Independent Variables  
Most of the independent variables used in this study are easily understood and 
need no further explanation. However, there are a number of variables relating to the age 
of dependent children to describe.  Since the current age of a child is irrelevant, the age of 
dependents at the time of interest is determined by subtracting the child’s date of birth 
from the service member’s present unit join date and dividing that by 365. This 
calculation returns negative ages for those dependents born after the member’s present 
unit join date. For the purpose of this thesis, only dependents aged 5 or older are of 
importance, and thus negative age calculations are not a concern.  
The variable for school age dependents records those between the ages of 5 and 
18 years old. This variable is used in binary form as well as in the form of 
“Num_SchoolAge,” which totals the number of school-age dependents in a single family. 
Likewise, variables indicating the level of study/school are created in the same manner. 
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Although each state has its own age requirements, a generally accepted criterion for age 
ranges is used for these school-level variables. The primary/elementary school variable is 
restricted to children between the ages of 5 and 10, middle school represents ages 11 
through 14, and secondary/high school includes children between 15 and 18 years old. 
Table 3 is a summary of the school-age children in this dataset. 
Table 3.   Summary of School-Age Children 
Variable Frequency Percent 
School Age 28308 11.84 
Elementary 14900 6.23 
Middle 7315 3.06 
Secondary 6093 2.59 
 
Table 4 provides a summary of the ethnicities represented in the dataset as these variables 
are critical to certain models in this thesis.  
Table 4.   Summary of Ethnicities   
Variable Frequency Percent 
White 104325 61.6 
Hispanic 29195 17.24 
Black 19163 11.32 
Asian 5879 3.47 
Other 2743 1.62 
 
Some observations in the original data are missing civilian education or years of 
service values. To ensure the missing observations are included in the analysis, X_EDU 
and X_SERVICE are created. These binary variables capture the effects of missing 
civilian education or years of service data.      
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D. METHODOLOGY MODELS 
A linear probability model would not be appropriate since the outcome of 
importance is binary and because we are interested in the probability (bounded between 0 
and 1) of being a geographic bachelor or living within a certain boundary. Linear 
probability models may produce predicted probabilities outside [0, 1], and thus, have no 
logical interpretation for this analysis. Meanwhile, Probit and Logistic or logit regression 
models are equally appropriate for this analysis. Several comparative tests are computed 
to identify whether great differences in the probit versus logit model results exist. The 
tests reveal that probit models have comparable goodness-of-fit to logit models and the 
estimates for each are similar; one model does not clearly out-perform the other. In the 
end, logit models are used to analyze the data because they produce a more appealing 
interpretation.   
1. Model 1: Geo-bachelor Probability 
To model the probability of geo-bachelorhood as a function of having school-age 
children, I estimate Model 1 using a logit regression (see Equation 3). 
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where i indexes individuals with school-age children and F(.) is the logistic function.  ß1 
through ß3 correspond to the association of geo-bachelorhood with school-age children 
by category, relative to secondary school-age dependents. SchoolAge=1 if i has any 
dependent children between the ages of 5 and 18 and zero otherwise; Elementary=1 if i 
has any dependent children between the ages of 5 and 10, zero otherwise; Middle=1 if 
any dependent children between the ages of 11 and 14, zero otherwise. Likewise, ß4 
through ß6 represent the effects of ethnicity on the probability of being a geo-bachelor 
(EHispanic=1 if declared Hispanic, zero otherwise; EBlack=1 if declared Black, zero 
otherwise; EAsian=1 if declared Asian, zero otherwise). Edu represents the level of 
civilian education for individual i and YearsSvc denotes the years of active service for 
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individual i. The last three variables, ∂1 through ∂3, indicate the association of geo-
bachelorhood with bases Albany, Twentynine Palms, and Hawaii relative to Camp 
LeJeune (Albany=1 if member assigned to Albany, zero otherwise; TwentyPalms=1 if 
member assigned to Twentynine Palms, zero otherwise; Hawaii=1 if member assigned to 
Hawaii, zero otherwise).   
2. Models 2–5: Probability of Living within School District Boundaries 
(Albany, Camp LeJeune, Twentynine Palms, and Hawaii) 
Models 2 through 5 are logit regressions estimating the effects of having school-
age children on the probability of living within the school district boundaries Albany, 
GA; Camp LeJeune/Jacksonville, NC; Twentynine Palms, CA; or MCB HI. Models 2 
through 5 can be seen in Equation 4: 
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where i indexes individuals with school-age children.  ß1 through ß3 correspond to the 
association of living in school district boundaries with school-age children by category, 
relative to secondary school-age dependents (SchoolAge=1 if any dependent children 
between the ages of 5 and 18, zero otherwise; Elementary=1 if any dependent children 
between the ages of 5 and 10, zero otherwise; Middle=1 if any dependent children 
between the ages of 11 and 14, zero otherwise). Likewise, ß4 through ß6 represent the 
effects of ethnicity on the probability of being a geo-bachelor (Ehispanic=1 if declared 
Hispanic, zero otherwise; Eblack=1 if declared Black, zero otherwise; Easian=1 if 
declared Asian, zero otherwise). Edu represents the level of civilian education for 
individual i and YearsSvc denotes the years of active service for individual i, while 
X_EDU and X_SERVICE represent observations with missing education or years of 
service data.   
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IV. RESULTS 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine how likely it is that Marines with 
school-age children choose to become geographic bachelors given they are assigned to 
bases with a reputation for low quality public K-12 schools. To further demonstrate how 
crucial school quality is to Marines’ location decisions, this thesis also assesses the 
probability that a family will choose to reside within the school district boundaries of 
these particular bases.   
A. MODEL 1: GEOGRAPHIC BACHELOR PROBABILITY 
1. Effects of School-Age Children 
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 5 reveal a positive relationship between both the 
presence and number of school-age children and the probability of being a geographic 
bachelor. Column (1) illustrates effects at the intensive margin, indicating that one more 
school-age child increases the probability of being a geographic bachelor; this 
relationship is statistically significant. Likewise, column (3) shows the extensive 
marginal effect that having school-age children has on the probability of being a 
geographic bachelor. This relationship is also positive and statistically significant, 
showing that in models without covariates, the probability of geo-bachelorhood is near-
certainty among Marines with any school-age children relative to those without who are 
assigned to these four bases. 
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Table 5.   Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Geo-bachelorhood 
 VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




  SchoolAge 
  
1.0150*** 0.7169*** 

































































Constant -2.6943*** -2.9608*** -2.7459*** -2.9728*** 
 
(0.0103) (0.0214) (0.0107) (0.0214) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In addition to the marginal effects, Table 6 shows the odds ratios that correspond 
to school-age children. The odds ratios represent the constant effect that school-age 
children have on the likelihood of being a geographic bachelor. As the table indicates, 
Marines with school-age children have greater odds of becoming geographic bachelors as 
compared to those without school-age children. When evaluated without demographic or 
other explanatory variables (column [3], Table 6), the odds that Marines with school-age 
children choose geographic bachelorhood are 2.76 times that of Marines with no school-
age children. Column (4) of Table 6 includes the demographic variables, base location, 
education level, and years of service. The results are statistically significant and reveal 
that the odds of Marines with school-age children choosing to be geographic bachelors 
are 2.05 times that of Marines without school-age children, all else held constant.  
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Table 6.   Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of Geo-bachelorhood 
 VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




  SchoolAge 
  
2.7593*** 2.0481*** 

































































Constant 0.0676*** 0.0518*** 0.0642*** 0.0512*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
seEform in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2. School Category Effects 
Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 reveal that the effects of having secondary school-age 
children are positive and much greater than the effects of any other school specific 
categories. Due to the impact that the secondary school variable has, the interpretation for 
column (4) of Tables 7 and 8 are given; these results are constructed using secondary 
school as the baseline.   
All of the school-age specific variables presented in Table 7, column (4) are 
statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. The results indicate that having one more 
elementary school-age child decreases the probability that a Marine chooses to be a 
geographic bachelor compared to having one more secondary school-age child, all else 
constant. When compared to having one more secondary school-age child, having one 
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more middle school-age child also has a negative effect on the probability of becoming a 
geographic bachelor, all else held constant. The effect of having one more secondary 
school-age child is economically large and meaningful, it suppresses the negative effects 
of the elementary and middle school-age child variables (relative to no school-aged 
children), allowing the school-age variable to reflect an overall positive effect when 
averaged across all school-aged children. The extensive marginal effects in Table 8, 
column (4) mirror those of the intensive effects, demonstrating a negative relationship 
between having at least one elementary or middle school-age child and the probability of 
geographic bachelorhood as compared to having at least one secondary school-age child, 
all else held constant.   
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Table 7.   Intensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Geo-bachelorhood 
 VARIABLES  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
     Num_SchoolAge 
 
0.0951*** -0.0879** 0.4020*** 
  















Num_Secondary 0.6498*** 0.5472*** 0.7369*** 
 
 
(0.0407) (0.0458) (0.0582) 
 Ehispanic 0.0596** 0.0592** 0.0600** 0.0580** 
 
(0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0258) 
Eblack -0.1085*** -0.1087*** -0.1087*** -0.1060*** 
 
(0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0331) 
Easian -0.3756*** -0.3758*** -0.3759*** -0.3762*** 
 
(0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0614) 
Albany 0.6305*** 0.6306*** 0.6312*** 0.6273*** 
 
(0.1219) (0.1219) (0.1218) (0.1214) 
TwentyPalms 0.5563*** 0.5565*** 0.5562*** 0.5581*** 
 
(0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0233) 
Hawii 0.5752*** 0.5761*** 0.5750*** 0.5805*** 
 
(0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0329) 
Edu 0.1563*** 0.1563*** 0.1562*** 0.1531*** 
 
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) 
YearsSvc 0.0376*** 0.0376*** 0.0378*** 0.0369*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
X_EDU -0.0149 -0.0166 -0.0142 -0.0171 
 
(0.1005) (0.1005) (0.1005) (0.1004) 
X_SERVICE 0.4041 0.4011 0.4063 0.3881 
 
(0.3635) (0.3628) (0.3638) (0.3588) 
Constant -3.1171*** -3.1162*** -3.1172*** -3.1091*** 
 
(0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8.   Extensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Geo-bachelorhood 
 VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
     SchoolAge 
 
0.5646*** 0.7097*** 1.1180*** 
  















Secondary 0.9086*** 0.5560*** 0.4127*** 
 
 
(0.0480) (0.0491) (0.0549) 
 Ehispanic 0.0581** 0.0560** 0.0554** 0.0585** 
 
(0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0258) 
Eblack -0.1083*** -0.1088*** -0.1138*** -0.1060*** 
 
(0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0331) 
Easian -0.3748*** -0.3700*** -0.3723*** -0.3696*** 
 
(0.0615) (0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0613) 
Albany 0.6344*** 0.6235*** 0.6295*** 0.6162*** 
 
(0.1226) (0.1223) (0.1220) (0.1235) 
TwentyPalms 0.5559*** 0.5543*** 0.5546*** 0.5542*** 
 
(0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0233) 
Hawii 0.5725*** 0.5686*** 0.5730*** 0.5695*** 
 
(0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0329) 
Edu 0.1592*** 0.1621*** 0.1627*** 0.1601*** 
 
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) 
YearsSvc 0.0341*** 0.0244*** 0.0209*** 0.0251*** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
X_EDU -0.0125 -0.0042 -0.0070 -0.0044 
 
(0.1004) (0.1000) (0.0998) (0.1001) 
X_SERVICE 0.3870 0.3512 0.3263 0.3479 
 
(0.3654) (0.3634) (0.3608) (0.3613) 
Constant -3.1239*** -3.1305*** -3.1245*** -3.1302*** 
 
(0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0224) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





The odds ratios in Tables 9 and 10 show the same relationships as the marginal 
effects results. Table 9, column (4) displays an odds ratio of 0.7418 for the number of 
elementary school-age children which means that having one more elementary school-
age child decreases the odds of becoming a geographic bachelor by 25.82 percent 
compared to having one more secondary school-age child, all else constant. Similarly, 
having one more middle school-age child decreases the odds of geographic bachelorhood 
by 40.66 percent compared to having one more secondary school-age child, all else held 
constant. As before, the extensive effects in Table 10, column (4) provide the same sort 
of analysis indicating that the odds of becoming a geographic bachelor are respectively 
43.2 percent or 40 percent less likely if a Marine has at least one elementary or middle 




Table 9.   Intensive Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of 
Geo-bachelorhood 
 VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
     Num_SchoolAge 
 
1.0998*** 0.9158*** 1.4949*** 
  















Num_Secondary 1.9151*** 1.7285*** 2.0894*** 
 
 
(0.0720) (0.0743) (0.1128) 
 Ehispanic 1.0614** 1.0610** 1.0618** 1.0598** 
 
(0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0273) 
Eblack 0.8972*** 0.8970*** 0.8970*** 0.8994*** 
 
(0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0298) 
Easian 0.6868*** 0.6867*** 0.6867*** 0.6864*** 
 
(0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0420) 
Albany 1.8786*** 1.8787*** 1.8798*** 1.8725*** 
 
(0.2275) (0.2275) (0.2276) (0.2258) 
TwentyPalms 1.7442*** 1.7445*** 1.7440*** 1.7474*** 
 
(0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0405) 
Hawii 1.7775*** 1.7790*** 1.7771*** 1.7870*** 
 
(0.0574) (0.0574) (0.0574) (0.0576) 
Edu 1.1692*** 1.1692*** 1.1691*** 1.1655*** 
 
(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0167) 
YearsSvc 1.0383*** 1.0383*** 1.0385*** 1.0376*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
X_EDU 0.9852 0.9836 0.9859 0.9831 
 
(0.0969) (0.0968) (0.0970) (0.0966) 
X_SERVICE 1.4980 1.4935 1.5013 1.4741 
 
(0.5326) (0.5310) (0.5337) (0.5241) 
Constant 0.0443*** 0.0443*** 0.0443*** 0.0446*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
seEform in parentheses 




Table 10.   Extensive Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of 
Geo-bachelorhood 
 VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
     SchoolAge 
 
1.7588*** 2.0334*** 3.0588*** 
  















Secondary 2.4808*** 1.7437*** 1.5110*** 
 
 
(0.1083) (0.0844) (0.0881) 
 Ehispanic 1.0598** 1.0576** 1.0570** 1.0603** 
 
(0.0273) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0273) 
Eblack 0.8973*** 0.8969*** 0.8924*** 0.8994*** 
 
(0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0298) 
Easian 0.6874*** 0.6908*** 0.6892*** 0.6910*** 
 
(0.0421) (0.0423) (0.0422) (0.0424) 
Albany 1.8859*** 1.8654*** 1.8767*** 1.8519*** 
 
(0.2285) (0.2256) (0.2271) (0.2242) 
TwentyPalms 1.7435*** 1.7407*** 1.7412*** 1.7406*** 
 
(0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0405) 
Hawii 1.7726*** 1.7658*** 1.7736*** 1.7673*** 
 
(0.0573) (0.0571) (0.0573) (0.0571) 
Edu 1.1725*** 1.1759*** 1.1767*** 1.1736*** 
 
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) 
YearsSvc 1.0347*** 1.0247*** 1.0212*** 1.0254*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
X_EDU 0.9876 0.9958 0.9930 0.9956 
 
(0.0972) (0.0978) (0.0975) (0.0978) 
X_SERVICE 1.4726 1.4208 1.3859 1.4162 
 
(0.5243) (0.5062) (0.4935) (0.5046) 
Constant 0.0440*** 0.0437*** 0.0440*** 0.0437*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
seEform in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3. Location Effects 
In this model, Camp LeJeune is the baseline location variable because it applies to 
the largest number of observations, representing 75.71 percent of the data. Albany is 
represented by the least amount of observations, making up only 0.27 percent of the data 
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while Twentynine Palms and Hawaii account for the remaining observations at 17.36 
percent and 6.67 percent respectively.   
The coefficient estimates and odds ratios of location variables in Tables 7, 8, 9 
and 10 reveal that when compared to Marines assigned to Camp LeJeune, those assigned 
to Albany have an increased probability of choosing to become geographic bachelors, all 
else constant. Similarly, those assigned to Twentynine Palms and Hawaii are also more 
likely to choose geographic bachelorhood compared to those assigned to Camp LeJeune, 
all else held constant. The estimates for these location variables are all statistically 
significant and of particular interest to this study.   
The odds ratios in column (4) of Tables 9 and 10 demonstrate the same general 
relationship between the locations and probability of geographic bachelorhood. The odds 
ratio associated with Albany in Table 9, column (4) indicates that the odds of Marines 
assigned to Albany choosing to be geographic bachelors are 1.87 times that of Marines 
assigned to Camp LeJeune, all else constant. Likewise, the odds of geographic 
bachelorhood for those assigned to Twentynine Palms or Hawaii, respectively, are 1.75 
and 1.79 times that of those assigned to Camp LeJeune, all else constant. The location 
variable extensive effects in Table 10, column (4) are also statistically significant and 
show little variation from the intensive effects in Table 9, column (4).    
B. MODELS 2–5: DISTRICT RESIDENCY PROBABILITIES 
Complete analysis results for each location boundary can be found in Appendices 
A through D.   
1. Effects of School-Age Children 
When other school-related variables are omitted from regression analysis, the 
school-age variable coefficient estimates and odds ratio results are statistically significant 
for all boundary locations (see Tables 11 and 12). Jacksonville odds ratio output in 
Table 12 indicates that Marines with school-age children are 2.54 times more likely to 
live within the school district boundaries than those without, all else held constant. The 
other locations reveal similar relationships where, among Marines assigned to 
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Twentynine Palms, those with school-age children are 1.99 times more likely to live 
within that school district boundary than those without school-age children, all else 
constant. Likewise, of Marines assigned to Hawaii and Albany, those with school-age 
children are 1.82 and 1.88 times more likely to live within the school district boundaries 
of their given locations than those without school-age children, all else held constant.    
Table 11.   Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of Living within 
School District Boundaries 
 VARIABLES CampLej 29Palms Hawaii Albany 
     SchoolAge 0.9323*** 0.6858*** 0.6000*** 0.6316*** 
 
(0.0293) (0.0543) (0.0597) (0.1797) 
Ehispanic -0.3747*** 0.1800*** 0.1493*** -0.1885 
 
(0.0217) (0.0351) (0.0412) (0.1725) 
Eblack -0.1906*** -0.4215*** -0.2953*** 0.6232*** 
 
(0.0242) (0.0516) (0.0570) (0.1385) 
Easian -0.7903*** -0.0758 0.6024*** -0.1684 
 
(0.0522) (0.0786) (0.0678) (0.3435) 
Edu -0.1857*** 0.0553*** 0.1864*** 0.2339*** 
 
(0.0137) (0.0197) (0.0192) (0.0583) 
YearsSvc 0.1438*** 0.0752*** 0.0947*** 0.1261*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0093) 
X_EDU -0.4022*** -0.4565*** -0.1313 0.0250 
 
(0.0787) (0.1586) (0.1662) (0.5866) 





 Constant -1.9569*** -3.8071*** -4.3826*** -7.4281*** 
 
(0.0176) (0.0289) (0.0319) (0.1091) 
     Observations 169,346 169,216 169,346 169,216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12.   Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of Living within 
School District Boundaries 
 VARIABLES CampLej 29Palms Hawaii Albany 
     SchoolAge 2.5403*** 1.9853*** 1.8221*** 1.8806*** 
 
(0.0633) (0.0881) (0.0869) (0.2776) 
Ehispanic 0.6875*** 1.1972*** 1.1610*** 0.8282 
 
(0.0146) (0.0418) (0.0476) (0.1413) 
Eblack 0.8265*** 0.6561*** 0.7443*** 1.8648*** 
 
(0.0200) (0.0337) (0.0419) (0.2571) 
Easian 0.4537*** 0.9270 1.8265*** 0.8450 
 
(0.0230) (0.0730) (0.1253) (0.2888) 
Edu 0.8306*** 1.0568*** 1.2049*** 1.2635*** 
 
(0.0100) (0.0196) (0.0225) (0.0690) 
YearsSvc 1.1547*** 1.0781*** 1.0993*** 1.1344*** 
 
(0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0098) 
X_EDU 0.6688*** 0.6335*** 0.8770 1.0253 
 
(0.0486) (0.1003) (0.1466) (0.6044) 





 Constant 0.1413*** 0.0222*** 0.0125*** 0.0006*** 
 
(0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
     Observations 169,346 169,216 169,346 169,216 
seEform in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2. School Category Effects 
Based on thorough comparisons of the results in Appendices A through D, 
Table 13 provides odds ratios using a baseline of secondary school-age for each boundary 
as this output provides the best overall interpretation. The effects of different school-age 
categories on the likelihood of living within the school district boundaries of an assigned 
base are different for each location. For those assigned to Albany, only one school-related 
variable is statistically significant, elementary. Of Marines assigned to Albany, those with 
elementary-age children are 1.84 times more likely to live within the district boundaries 
compared to those with secondary school-age children, all else held constant.   
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The results for Jacksonville, Twentynine Palms, and Hawaii each reveal 
statistically significant adverse relationships between middle school-age children and 
living within the school district boundary. Those assigned to Jacksonville with middle 
school-age children are 51.5 percent less likely to live within the school district 
boundaries than those with secondary school-age children, all else held constant. 
Similarly, Marines with middle school-age children assigned to Twentynine Palms and 
Hawaii are 35.4 percent and 31.6 percent less likely to live within their location’s school 
district boundary compared to those with secondary school-age children, all else constant.   
The school-age variables for Twentynine Palms and Hawaii are statistically 
significant and demonstrate a positive relationship between having school-age children 
and living within the school district boundaries. For Marines assigned to Twentynine 
Palms, those with at least one school-age child are 2 times more likely to live within the 
district boundaries than those without any school-age children. Likewise, Hawaii Marines 
with school-age children are 1.86 times more likely to live within their school district 
boundaries than those without, all else held constant.     
Jacksonville is the only location that has statistically significant results for all 
school related variables. Similar to the results for middle school-age children, Marines of 
Jacksonville that have elementary school-age children are 23.78 percent less likely than 
those with secondary school-age children to live within the school district boundaries, all 
else constant. Results for school-age children in general reveal that of Marines assigned 
to Jacksonville, those with at least one child of school-age are 3.4 times more likely to 




Table 13.   Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of Living within 
School District Boundaries 
VARIABLES CampLej 29Palms Hawaii Albany 
     SchoolAge 3.4487*** 2.0217*** 1.8634*** 1.2414 
 
(0.1276) (0.1253) (0.1253) (0.2660) 
Elementary 0.7622*** 1.0925 1.0857 1.8413*** 
 
(0.0300) (0.0627) (0.0656) (0.3290) 
Middle 0.4848*** 0.6460*** 0.6841*** 0.8264 
 
(0.0207) (0.0404) (0.0438) (0.1407) 
Ehispanic 0.6905*** 1.1990*** 1.1622*** 0.8232 
 
(0.0147) (0.0419) (0.0477) (0.1405) 
Eblack 0.8349*** 0.6621*** 0.7513*** 1.9021*** 
 
(0.0202) (0.0340) (0.0423) (0.2624) 
Easian 0.4539*** 0.9290 1.8311*** 0.8430 
 
(0.0230) (0.0731) (0.1256) (0.2880) 
Edu 0.8299*** 1.0548*** 1.2031*** 1.2563*** 
 
(0.0100) (0.0196) (0.0225) (0.0685) 
YearsSvc 1.1634*** 1.0825*** 1.1030*** 1.1417*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0099) 
X_EDU 0.6676*** 0.6367*** 0.8801 1.0356 
 
(0.0486) (0.1008) (0.1473) (0.6106) 





 Constant 0.1386*** 0.0220*** 0.0124*** 0.0006*** 
 
(0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
     Observations 169,346 169,216 169,346 169,216 
seEform in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3. Demographic Effects 
Among the results in Table 13, the ethnicity variable that is statistically 
significant across all locations is Eblack. The only location that exhibits a positive 
relationship between Eblack and the likelihood of living within the school district 
boundary is Albany, indicating that black Marines are 1.9 times more likely than white 
Marines to live within the boundaries, all else constant. The other locations reveal a 
negative correlation between being black and living within the school district boundaries 
of an assigned location. The location with the greatest negative effect is Twentynine 
Palms, where black Marines are 33.79 percent less likely to live within the boundary than 
white Marines, all else constant. Results for Hawaii are similar to Twentynine Palms; 
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compared to white Marines, black Marines are 24.87 percent less likely to live within 
Marine Corps Base Hawaii’s school district boundaries, all else constant. Of Marines 
assigned to Jacksonville, those identified as black are 16.51 percent less likely to live 
within the school district boundaries than those who are white, all else constant.  
Table 14 displays the mean distribution of Marines identified as “black/African 
American” by location. Marines identified as black account for 11 percent of the total 
observations within the data. When sorted by location, this number is nearly doubled for 
Albany, where 21 percent of the represented population is black. Jacksonville results 
resemble the overall data at 12 percent while Twentynine Palms and Hawaii are just 
below the total at 8 percent.   









Alternative models to logit regressions include linear probability models and 
probit regressions. Linear probability models are inappropriate for this study due to the 
potential for analysis results that exceed a [0, 1] boundary limitation. Results outside of 
[0, 1] provide no rational explanations in this analysis. Since both probit and logit models 
are appropriate for this type of analysis, each is executed and then compared the other. 
The results for all probit and logit models were consistent across all variables. Probit 
regression results are provided in Appendix E.   
A large majority of the observations in the dataset are “Ewhite” and assigned to 
“CAMP_LEJ”; therefore, these variables are used as control groups in all models 
estimating the probability of becoming a geographic bachelor. In this study, all of the 
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school-age variables have potential as core explanatory variables. As such, robustness 
checks are conducted by executing a series of logit regressions leaving out a different 
school-age variable as the baseline each time. As displayed in Tables 7 and 8, the 
regression results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar, regardless of which school-
age variable is used as the baseline or excluded category.   
When analysis is limited to married Marines only, the results discussed above are 
generally confirmed. However, both analyses indicate that there is a great deal left 
unexplained.  Results using the full population of Marines with PCS orders to the four 
locations are preferred, given the scope of the research question. Limiting the sample to 
married Marines only also reduces the amount of variation in the data which leads to less 
meaningful interpretations. As Table 15, column (1) indicates, of Marines who are 
married, those with one more secondary school-age child are 1.85 times more likely to be 
geo-bachelors than married Marines with non-secondary school-age children, all else 
held constant. This estimate is significant at the p<0.1 level or with 90 percent degree of 
statistical confidence.  Similarly, Table 15, column (2) shows that married Marines with 
at least one secondary school-age child are 1.18 times more likely to be geo-bachelors 
than those married Marines with at least one non-secondary school-age child, all else held 
constant (p<0.05). Table 16 provides details regarding the base-specific distributions of 
geo-bachelors and school-age children when single Marines are omitted. Note, however, 
the pseudo R-squared in this analysis is only 0.0353 (0.028 when single Marines are 








Table 15.   Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of Geo-bachelorhood 
(Married Marines only)    
VARIABLES Column (1) Column (2) 


















Ehispanic 1.2622*** 1.2649*** 
 
(0.0366) (0.0367) 
Eblack 1.1737*** 1.1772*** 
 
(0.0437) (0.0438) 
Easian 1.0734 1.0730 
 
(0.0734) (0.0733) 
Albany 1.5216*** 1.5266*** 
 
(0.1990) (0.1996) 
TwentyPalms 1.5091*** 1.5098*** 
 
(0.0397) (0.0397) 
Hawii 1.0573 1.0570 
 
(0.0366) (0.0366) 
Edu 1.0797*** 1.0791*** 
 
(0.0161) (0.0161) 
YearsSvc 0.9246*** 0.9275*** 
 
(0.0028) (0.0026) 
X_EDU 0.9774 0.9754 
 
(0.1032) (0.1029) 
X_SERVICE 2.9582*** 3.0162*** 
 
(1.0159) (1.0321) 
Constant 0.3340*** 0.3332*** 
 
(0.0085) (0.0085) 
   Observations 51,429 51,429 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 16.   Base-Specific Summary Statistics of Married Marines 
BASE        Total     Geo-bachelor    School-Age Child  
Jacksonville 35,463 20.72% 26.90% 
29-Palms 9,355 29.76% 23.97% 
Hawaii 6,131 21.40% 30.34% 













V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis analyzes the impact school-age children have on the likelihood of 
Marines choosing to become geographic bachelors or choosing to live within the school 
district boundaries when assigned to locations that have a reputation for low quality 
public K-12 schools. Locations perceived by Marines and their families to have low 
quality public schools are: Jacksonville, North Carolina, Albany, Georgia, Twentynine 
Palms, California and MCBH (Hawaii).  
Using estimates derived from logit regression models, results show the probability 
of becoming a geographic bachelor in the locations of interest are positively related with 
having school-age children. Among Marines with school-age children, the greatest 
increase in the probability of being a geographic bachelor is most pronounced for those 
Marines with secondary (high school) school-age children, compared to either middle 
school-aged children and/or elementary school-aged children, all else held constant. 
These results are not surprising; some factors are likely to be more significant at the 
secondary school level, so that Marines with children at this age prefer them to have the 
stability rather than move them around. Parents and the children themselves may desire to 
stay at the same secondary school until graduation in order to ensure all requirements are 
met on time, maintain the same level of academic expectations, provide the best 
opportunities for scholarships (athletic or other), or develop meaningful relationships.   
When differences in geographic locations are taken into consideration, Marines 
assigned to Albany, Georgia are most likely to choose geographic bachelorhood 
compared to the other three locations, all else constant. Among all four of the locations 
examined, Marines of Jacksonville, North Carolina are the least likely to become 
geographic bachelors, all else constant. A possible explanation for the lower odds ratio 
output of Jacksonville Marines is the fact that this is the only location which offers 
Department of Defense operated schools.   
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Having school-age children is also positively associated with living inside the 
school district boundaries of the specified locations. Of all the locations, the greatest 
positive relationship between school-age children and living within the boundaries is 
revealed among Marines assigned to Jacksonville while the lowest likelihood of living 
within the boundary is associated with Albany.   
A dramatic difference exists between Albany and the other three locations in 
regards to the effects of ethnicity on the likelihood of living within the school district 
boundaries. Albany is the only location in which Marines identified as being black are 
more likely to live within the boundaries than Marines identified as white, all else 
constant. The other three locations reveal that black Marines are less likely than white 
Marines to live within their school district boundaries, all else constant.  
There are many limitations to this study. First, only correlative relationships are 
established, this analysis does not establish causality. Second, there are omitted variables 
which may have a great impact on the dependent variables used in analysis. Third, the 
locations of interest are based on a narrow survey and may not accurately reflect the 
perceptions of all individuals represented in the data.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the limitations of this study, five general recommendations are 
provided. 
1. Conduct similar analysis to this study but include locations that have less 
negative perceptions of K-12 public school options. Based on the 2015 
school liaison survey data, some areas to consider are: Quantico, Virginia, 
Henderson Hall, Virginia, Camp Pendleton, California, Cherry Point, 
North Carolina, and Beaufort, South Carolina.  
2. Perform within state comparisons among the locations of interest in order 
to identify if the perceptions of under-performing public K-12 schools are 
accurate. Within state comparisons are necessary because there is wide 
variation in the U.S. education system and this variation is reduced at the 
state-level.   
3. Gather additional data relating to dependents’ location. Having a full zip 
code for the dependents’ residence would ensure the boundary variables 
are well defined. Using this data in geographic information system models 
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may provide a better analysis for the relationship between dependent 
residencies and school district boundaries or Marine spouse’s location.  
4. Implement base-wide procedures directing all personnel with at least one 
school-age dependent to check in and check out with the school liaison 
office. This would allow the liaisons to identify and keep track of the type 
of schooling dependents receive, whether public, private, charter, or home 
school. Additionally, the school liaison office should request quarterly 
updates from all surrounding schools to identify the number of 
military/DOD affiliated students enrolled.  
5. Conduct Marine Corps wide surveys designed to identify all of the reasons 
families may choose not to co-locate. Questions should include topics 
such as spouse’s career/job opportunities or aspirations, children’s 
achievements/extracurricular activities, importance of education, long-
term goals or expectations, and location of extended family. Questions 
should also offer opportunities for respondents to rank the quality of K-12 
education opportunities for locations they are familiar with either through 
















APPENDIX A.  LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ALBANY 
Table 17.   Intensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Living within School District Boundaries (Albany)  
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
     Num_SchoolAge 
 
0.3607*** 0.1085 -0.0780 
  















Num_Secondary -0.4013** -0.7845*** -0.5225** 
 
 
(0.1756) (0.1852) (0.2069) 
 Ehispanic -0.1741 -0.1804 -0.1769 -0.1776 
 
(0.1731) (0.1731) (0.1731) (0.1729) 
Eblack 0.6568*** 0.6585*** 0.6544*** 0.6460*** 
 
(0.1388) (0.1387) (0.1388) (0.1387) 
Easian -0.1871 -0.1780 -0.1863 -0.1814 
 
(0.3450) (0.3443) (0.3451) (0.3448) 
Edu 0.2179*** 0.2199*** 0.2188*** 0.2228*** 
 
(0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0586) (0.0584) 
YearsSvc 0.1439*** 0.1410*** 0.1415*** 0.1402*** 
 
(0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
X_EDU 0.0332 0.0216 0.0320 0.0334 
 
(0.5854) (0.5851) (0.5854) (0.5855) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - 
     Constant -7.4353*** -7.4318*** -7.4345*** -7.4331*** 
 
(0.1084) (0.1085) (0.1083) (0.1082) 
     Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 18.   Extensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Living within School District Boundaries (Albany) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
     SchoolAge 
 
0.8531*** 0.4013* 0.2162 
  















Secondary -0.4690** -0.8120*** -0.6262*** 
 
 
(0.1990) (0.2006) (0.2129) 
 Ehispanic -0.1854 -0.1845 -0.1886 -0.1945 
 
(0.1730) (0.1726) (0.1727) (0.1727) 
Eblack 0.6598*** 0.6550*** 0.6528*** 0.6430*** 
 
(0.1389) (0.1387) (0.1387) (0.1384) 
Easian -0.1802 -0.1756 -0.1771 -0.1708 
 
(0.3438) (0.3446) (0.3442) (0.3435) 
Edu 0.2201*** 0.2235*** 0.2224*** 0.2282*** 
 
(0.0584) (0.0585) (0.0584) (0.0582) 
YearsSvc 0.1426*** 0.1338*** 0.1344*** 0.1325*** 
 
(0.0074) (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
X_EDU 0.0366 0.0367 0.0401 0.0350 
 
(0.5861) (0.5863) (0.5862) (0.5866) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - 
     Constant -7.4527*** -7.4577*** -7.4588*** -7.4546*** 
 
(0.1088) (0.1102) (0.1095) (0.1095) 
     Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 19.   Intensive Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of Living 
within School District Boundaries (Albany) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
          
Num_SchoolAge 
 
1.4343*** 1.1146 0.9250 
  















Num_Secondary 0.6695** 0.4563*** 0.5930** 
 
 
(0.1164) (0.0826) (0.1209) 
 Ehispanic 0.8402 0.8349 0.8379 0.8373 
 
(0.1434) (0.1425) (0.1430) (0.1429) 
Eblack 1.9286*** 1.9319*** 1.9240*** 1.9080*** 
 
(0.2664) (0.2668) (0.2656) (0.2634) 
Easian 0.8294 0.8369 0.8300 0.8341 
 
(0.2837) (0.2862) (0.2840) (0.2852) 
Edu 1.2435*** 1.2459*** 1.2446*** 1.2496*** 
 
(0.0681) (0.0683) (0.0682) (0.0684) 
YearsSvc 1.1548*** 1.1515*** 1.1520*** 1.1505*** 
 
(0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
X_EDU 1.0338 1.0218 1.0325 1.0340 
 
(0.6094) (0.6025) (0.6087) (0.6095) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - 
     Constant 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
     Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
seEform in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20.   Extensive Odds Ratios of Variables on the 
Probability of Living within School District 
Boundaries (Albany) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
     SchoolAge 
 
2.3469*** 1.4937* 1.2414 
  















Secondary 0.6256** 0.4440*** 0.5346*** 
 
 
(0.1266) (0.0900) (0.1156) 
 Ehispanic 0.8308 0.8316 0.8282 0.8232 
 
(0.1418) (0.1419) (0.1414) (0.1405) 
Eblack 1.9344*** 1.9251*** 1.9210*** 1.9021*** 
 
(0.2671) (0.2657) (0.2651) (0.2624) 
Easian 0.8351 0.8389 0.8377 0.8430 
 
(0.2854) (0.2870) (0.2864) (0.2880) 
Edu 1.2463*** 1.2504*** 1.2491*** 1.2563*** 
 
(0.0682) (0.0684) (0.0682) (0.0685) 
YearsSvc 1.1533*** 1.1431*** 1.1439*** 1.1417*** 
 
(0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0099) 
X_EDU 1.0373 1.0374 1.0410 1.0356 
 
(0.6115) (0.6120) (0.6137) (0.6106) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - 
     Constant 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
     Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
seEform in parentheses 




APPENDIX B.  LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 
JACKSONVILLE/CAMP LEJEUNE 
Table 21.   Intensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Living within School District Boundaries (Jacksonville) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
          
Num_SchoolAge 
 
0.3069*** -0.2170*** 0.3570*** 
  















Num_Secondary 0.7976*** 0.4677*** 1.0256*** 
 
 
(0.0527) (0.0568) (0.0638) 
 Ehispanic -0.3650*** -0.3646*** -0.3631*** -0.3644*** 
 
(0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) 
Eblack -0.1799*** -0.1802*** -0.1783*** -0.1773*** 
 
(0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0242) 
Easian -0.7925*** -0.7931*** -0.7931*** -0.7907*** 
 
(0.0525) (0.0523) (0.0526) (0.0522) 
Edu -0.1932*** -0.1930*** -0.1943*** -0.1943*** 
 
(0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0136) 
YearsSvc 0.1641*** 0.1655*** 0.1665*** 0.1638*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
X_EDU -0.4199*** -0.4278*** -0.4178*** -0.4157*** 
 
(0.0800) (0.0803) (0.0799) (0.0798) 
X_SERVICE = o, 0.5558** 0.5521** 0.5663** 0.5454** 
 
(0.2631) (0.2630) (0.2642) (0.2619) 
Constant -1.9612*** -1.9585*** -1.9640*** -1.9516*** 
 
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0175) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 22.   Extensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Living within School District Boundaries (Jacksonville) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
     SchoolAge 
 
0.9437*** 0.7449*** 1.2380*** 
  















Secondary 1.0292*** 0.3567*** 0.4292*** 
 
 
(0.0539) (0.0515) (0.0649) 
 Ehispanic -0.3684*** -0.3716*** -0.3748*** -0.3704*** 
 
(0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0217) 
Eblack -0.1790*** -0.1816*** -0.1916*** -0.1805*** 
 
(0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0242) 
Easian -0.7919*** -0.7899*** -0.7909*** -0.7900*** 
 
(0.0527) (0.0524) (0.0523) (0.0524) 
Edu -0.1904*** -0.1858*** -0.1846*** -0.1865*** 
 
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0137) 
YearsSvc 0.1606*** 0.1516*** 0.1456*** 0.1514*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
X_EDU -0.4146*** -0.4073*** -0.4106*** -0.4040*** 
 
(0.0798) (0.0791) (0.0790) (0.0789) 
X_SERVICE = o, 0.5348** 0.5097* 0.4736* 0.5060* 
 
(0.2624) (0.2613) (0.2554) (0.2613) 
Constant -1.9695*** -1.9770*** -1.9622*** -1.9759*** 
 
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 23.   Intensive Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of Living 
within School District Boundaries (Jacksonville) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
          
Num_SchoolAge 
 
1.3592*** 0.8049*** 1.4291*** 
  















Num_Secondary 2.2201*** 1.5963*** 2.7886*** 
 
 
(0.0804) (0.0635) (0.1286) 
 Ehispanic 0.6942*** 0.6944*** 0.6955*** 0.6946*** 
 
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
Eblack 0.8354*** 0.8351*** 0.8367*** 0.8375*** 
 
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0201) 
Easian 0.4527*** 0.4524*** 0.4524*** 0.4535*** 
 
(0.0230) (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0229) 
Edu 0.8244*** 0.8245*** 0.8234*** 0.8234*** 
 
(0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0098) 
YearsSvc 1.1783*** 1.1799*** 1.1812*** 1.1779*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
X_EDU 0.6571*** 0.6520*** 0.6585*** 0.6599*** 
 
(0.0480) (0.0477) (0.0481) (0.0481) 
X_SERVICE = o, 1.7433** 1.7370** 1.7617** 1.7254** 
 
(0.4570) (0.4558) (0.4616) (0.4518) 
Constant 0.1407*** 0.1411*** 0.1403*** 0.1421*** 
 
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
seEform in parentheses 




Table 24.   Extensive Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of Living 
within School District Boundaries (Jacksonville) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
     SchoolAge 
 
2.5695*** 2.1063*** 3.4487*** 
  















Secondary 2.7987*** 1.4286*** 1.5360*** 
 
 
(0.1102) (0.0595) (0.0796) 
 Ehispanic 0.6919*** 0.6897*** 0.6874*** 0.6905*** 
 
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0147) 
Eblack 0.8361*** 0.8339*** 0.8257*** 0.8349*** 
 
(0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0202) 
Easian 0.4530*** 0.4539*** 0.4534*** 0.4539*** 
 
(0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0230) 
Edu 0.8267*** 0.8304*** 0.8315*** 0.8299*** 
 
(0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
YearsSvc 1.1743*** 1.1637*** 1.1567*** 1.1634*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
X_EDU 0.6606*** 0.6655*** 0.6632*** 0.6676*** 
 
(0.0483) (0.0485) (0.0483) (0.0486) 
X_SERVICE = o, 1.7072** 1.6647* 1.6057* 1.6586* 
 
(0.4491) (0.4380) (0.4224) (0.4361) 
Constant 0.1395*** 0.1385*** 0.1405*** 0.1386*** 
 
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
seEform in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C.  LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 
TWENTYNINE PALMS 
Table 25.   Intensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Living within School District Boundaries (Twentynine Palms) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
          
Num_SchoolAge 
 
0.2407*** -0.1517*** 0.0899** 
  















Num_Secondary 0.2397*** -0.0276 0.3946*** 
 
 
(0.0542) (0.0572) (0.0704) 
 Ehispanic 0.1874*** 0.1863*** 0.1889*** 0.1881*** 
 
(0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0351) 
Eblack -0.4116*** -0.4121*** -0.4113*** -0.4078*** 
 
(0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0517) 
Easian -0.0801 -0.0803 -0.0806 -0.0809 
 
(0.0786) (0.0785) (0.0786) (0.0785) 
Edu 0.0475** 0.0477** 0.0471** 0.0452** 
 
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0197) 
YearsSvc 0.0923*** 0.0929*** 0.0935*** 0.0938*** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
X_EDU -0.4619*** -0.4717*** -0.4591*** -0.4625*** 
 
(0.1579) (0.1584) (0.1578) (0.1579) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - 
     Constant -3.8020*** -3.7977*** -3.8032*** -3.8002*** 
 
(0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) 
     Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 26.   Extensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Living within School District Boundaries (Twentynine Palms) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
     SchoolAge 
 
0.7877*** 0.5495*** 0.7039*** 
  















Secondary 0.3263*** -0.0728 0.0233 
 
 
(0.0675) (0.0626) (0.0659) 
 Ehispanic 0.1827*** 0.1821*** 0.1791*** 0.1815*** 
 
(0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0351) 
Eblack -0.4112*** -0.4120*** -0.4192*** -0.4123*** 
 
(0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0516) (0.0516) 
Easian -0.0797 -0.0734 -0.0759 -0.0736 
 
(0.0786) (0.0786) (0.0786) (0.0786) 
Edu 0.0503** 0.0531*** 0.0544*** 0.0534*** 
 
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) 
YearsSvc 0.0887*** 0.0793*** 0.0758*** 0.0793*** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) 
X_EDU -0.4579*** -0.4519*** -0.4531*** -0.4515*** 
 
(0.1585) (0.1586) (0.1585) (0.1585) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - 
     Constant -3.8080*** -3.8165*** -3.8076*** -3.8165*** 
 
(0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0290) 
     Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 27.   Intensive Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of Living 
within School District Boundaries (Twentynine Palms) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
          
Num_SchoolAge 
 
1.2721*** 0.8593*** 1.0941** 
  















Num_Secondary 1.2708*** 0.9728 1.4839*** 
 
 
(0.0616) (0.0510) (0.0958) 
 Ehispanic 1.2061*** 1.2048*** 1.2079*** 1.2070*** 
 
(0.0422) (0.0421) (0.0422) (0.0422) 
Eblack 0.6626*** 0.6622*** 0.6628*** 0.6651*** 
 
(0.0341) (0.0340) (0.0341) (0.0342) 
Easian 0.9230 0.9228 0.9225 0.9223 
 
(0.0727) (0.0726) (0.0726) (0.0726) 
Edu 1.0487** 1.0489** 1.0483** 1.0462** 
 
(0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0194) 
YearsSvc 1.0967*** 1.0973*** 1.0980*** 1.0983*** 
 
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
X_EDU 0.6301*** 0.6239*** 0.6319*** 0.6297*** 
 
(0.0998) (0.0988) (0.1000) (0.0997) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - 
     Constant 0.0223*** 0.0224*** 0.0223*** 0.0224*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
     Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
seEform in parentheses 





Table 28.   Extensive Odds Ratios of Variables on the 
Probability of Living within School District 
Boundaries (Twentynine Palms) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
     SchoolAge 
 
2.1983*** 1.7324*** 2.0217*** 
  















Secondary 1.3858*** 0.9298 1.0235 
 
 
(0.0812) (0.0552) (0.0690) 
 Ehispanic 1.2005*** 1.1998*** 1.1961*** 1.1990*** 
 
(0.0420) (0.0420) (0.0418) (0.0419) 
Eblack 0.6629*** 0.6623*** 0.6576*** 0.6621*** 
 
(0.0341) (0.0340) (0.0338) (0.0340) 
Easian 0.9234 0.9292 0.9269 0.9290 
 
(0.0727) (0.0732) (0.0730) (0.0731) 
Edu 1.0516*** 1.0545*** 1.0559*** 1.0548*** 
 
(0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) 
YearsSvc 1.0928*** 1.0826*** 1.0787*** 1.0825*** 
 
(0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
X_EDU 0.6326*** 0.6364*** 0.6357*** 0.6367*** 
 
(0.1002) (0.1008) (0.1006) (0.1008) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - 
     Constant 0.0222*** 0.0220*** 0.0222*** 0.0220*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
     Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
seEform in parentheses 




APPENDIX D.  LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MARINE 
CORPS BASE HAWAII 
Table 29.   Intensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Living within School District Boundaries (Hawaii) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
          
Num_SchoolAge 
 
0.1865*** -0.0956** 0.0456 
  















Num_Secondary 0.1499** -0.0581 0.2488*** 
 
 
(0.0587) (0.0614) (0.0750) 
 Ehispanic 0.1575*** 0.1566*** 0.1587*** 0.1584*** 
 
(0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412) 
Eblack -0.2845*** -0.2849*** -0.2842*** -0.2813*** 
 
(0.0570) (0.0570) (0.0571) (0.0570) 
Easian 0.5970*** 0.5964*** 0.5966*** 0.5963*** 
 
(0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0679) 
Edu 0.1790*** 0.1793*** 0.1787*** 0.1772*** 
 
(0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0192) 
YearsSvc 0.1106*** 0.1110*** 0.1115*** 0.1118*** 
 
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
X_EDU -0.1409 -0.1489 -0.1391 -0.1410 
 
(0.1673) (0.1674) (0.1673) (0.1672) 
X_SERVICE = o, 0.2055 0.2023 0.2102 0.2079 
 
(0.7224) (0.7225) (0.7225) (0.7224) 
Constant -4.3768*** -4.3728*** -4.3777*** -4.3760*** 
 
(0.0320) (0.0319) (0.0320) (0.0320) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 30.   Extensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of 
Living within School District Boundaries (Hawaii) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
     SchoolAge 
 
0.7036*** 0.4857*** 0.6224*** 
  















Secondary 0.2457*** -0.0811 -0.0051 
 
 
(0.0732) (0.0675) (0.0702) 
 Ehispanic 0.1520*** 0.1511*** 0.1485*** 0.1503*** 
 
(0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0411) (0.0412) 
Eblack -0.2840*** -0.2853*** -0.2923*** -0.2860*** 
 
(0.0570) (0.0570) (0.0569) (0.0570) 
Easian 0.5985*** 0.6051*** 0.6024*** 0.6049*** 
 
(0.0679) (0.0679) (0.0678) (0.0678) 
Edu 0.1816*** 0.1845*** 0.1851*** 0.1849*** 
 
(0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0192) 
YearsSvc 0.1072*** 0.0981*** 0.0955*** 0.0981*** 
 
(0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0033) 
X_EDU -0.1366 -0.1273 -0.1283 -0.1277 
 
(0.1673) (0.1668) (0.1662) (0.1668) 
X_SERVICE = o, 0.1907 0.1483 0.1258 0.1492 
 
(0.7227) (0.7231) (0.7231) (0.7231) 
Constant -4.3841*** -4.3923*** -4.3838*** -4.3924*** 
 
(0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0319) (0.0320) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 31.   Intensive Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of Living 
within School District Boundaries (Hawaii) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
          
Num_SchoolAge 
 
1.2050*** 0.9088** 1.0467 
  















Num_Secondary 1.1618*** 0.9436 1.2825*** 
 
 
(0.0598) (0.0524) (0.0858) 
 Ehispanic 1.1706*** 1.1695*** 1.1720*** 1.1716*** 
 
(0.0480) (0.0480) (0.0481) (0.0481) 
Eblack 0.7524*** 0.7521*** 0.7526*** 0.7548*** 
 
(0.0423) (0.0423) (0.0424) (0.0425) 
Easian 1.8167*** 1.8156*** 1.8160*** 1.8154*** 
 
(0.1246) (0.1244) (0.1245) (0.1245) 
Edu 1.1961*** 1.1964*** 1.1957*** 1.1939*** 
 
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0223) 
YearsSvc 1.1169*** 1.1174*** 1.1180*** 1.1183*** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
X_EDU 0.8686 0.8616 0.8702 0.8685 
 
(0.1455) (0.1444) (0.1458) (0.1455) 
X_SERVICE = o, 1.2281 1.2243 1.2339 1.2311 
 
(0.8901) (0.8873) (0.8944) (0.8923) 
Constant 0.0126*** 0.0126*** 0.0126*** 0.0126*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
seEform in parentheses 




Table 32.   Extensive Odds Ratios of Variables on the Probability of Living 
within School District Boundaries (Hawaii) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) 
     SchoolAge 
 
2.0210*** 1.6252*** 1.8634*** 
  















Secondary 1.2785*** 0.9221 0.9949 
 
 
(0.0795) (0.0579) (0.0697) 
 Ehispanic 1.1642*** 1.1631*** 1.1601*** 1.1622*** 
 
(0.0478) (0.0477) (0.0476) (0.0477) 
Eblack 0.7528*** 0.7518*** 0.7466*** 0.7513*** 
 
(0.0424) (0.0423) (0.0420) (0.0423) 
Easian 1.8194*** 1.8314*** 1.8265*** 1.8311*** 
 
(0.1248) (0.1257) (0.1253) (0.1256) 
Edu 1.1991*** 1.2026*** 1.2033*** 1.2031*** 
 
(0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) 
YearsSvc 1.1131*** 1.1031*** 1.1003*** 1.1030*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
X_EDU 0.8724 0.8804 0.8796 0.8801 
 
(0.1462) (0.1473) (0.1471) (0.1473) 
X_SERVICE = o, 1.2100 1.1599 1.1341 1.1609 
 
(0.8769) (0.8401) (0.8212) (0.8409) 
Constant 0.0125*** 0.0124*** 0.0125*** 0.0124*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
     Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
seEform in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX E.  PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 33.   Probit Intensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability 
of Geo-bachelorhood 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) 
      Num_SchoolAge 0.0872*** 
 

























0.3677*** 0.3140*** 0.4186*** 
 
  
(0.0219) (0.0247) (0.0307) 
 EHispanic 0.0299** 0.0301** 0.0300** 0.0303** 0.0295** 
 
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
EBlack -0.0529*** -0.0534*** -0.0535*** -0.0534*** -0.0531*** 
 
(0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) 
EAsian -0.1808*** -0.1794*** -0.1795*** -0.1795*** -0.1799*** 
 
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) 
Albany 0.3177*** 0.3176*** 0.3177*** 0.3177*** 0.3175*** 
 
(0.0664) (0.0667) (0.0667) (0.0667) (0.0667) 
TwentyPalms 0.2735*** 0.2721*** 0.2722*** 0.2720*** 0.2732*** 
 
(0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0116) 
Hawaii 0.2926*** 0.2871*** 0.2875*** 0.2869*** 0.2907*** 
 
(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) 
Edu 0.0804*** 0.0834*** 0.0835*** 0.0834*** 0.0821*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
YearsSvc 0.0194*** 0.0204*** 0.0204*** 0.0205*** 0.0197*** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
X_EDU 0.0070 0.0035 0.0028 0.0040 0.0030 
 
(0.0466) (0.0468) (0.0468) (0.0468) (0.0467) 
X_SERVICE 0.1703 0.1920 0.1890 0.1946 0.1731 
 
(0.1722) (0.1741) (0.1738) (0.1742) (0.1725) 
Constant -1.7392*** -1.7474*** -1.7469*** -1.7474*** -1.7428*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
      Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 34.   Probit Extensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability 
of Geo-bachelorhood 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) 
      SchoolAge 0.3516*** 
 

























0.4904*** 0.3078*** 0.2294*** 
 
  
(0.0253) (0.0272) (0.0312) 
 EHispanic 0.0271** 0.0295** 0.0282** 0.0280** 0.0294** 
 
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
EBlack -0.0551*** -0.0531*** -0.0539*** -0.0559*** -0.0528*** 
 
(0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) 
EAsian -0.1787*** -0.1791*** -0.1778*** -0.1788*** -0.1781*** 
 
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) 
Albany 0.3159*** 0.3189*** 0.3152*** 0.3170*** 0.3149*** 
 
(0.0667) (0.0669) (0.0669) (0.0668) (0.0673) 
TwentyPalms 0.2728*** 0.2718*** 0.2716*** 0.2718*** 0.2717*** 
 
(0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) 
Hawaii 0.2901*** 0.2856*** 0.2849*** 0.2870*** 0.2853*** 
 
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) 
Edu 0.0837*** 0.0845*** 0.0857*** 0.0860*** 0.0851*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
YearsSvc 0.0117*** 0.0190*** 0.0147*** 0.0129*** 0.0150*** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
X_EDU 0.0123 0.0044 0.0076 0.0065 0.0082 
 
(0.0465) (0.0468) (0.0468) (0.0467) (0.0468) 
X_SERVICE 0.1430 0.1868 0.1694 0.1533 0.1673 
 
(0.1727) (0.1747) (0.1744) (0.1738) (0.1744) 
Constant -1.7449*** -1.7505*** -1.7526*** -1.7495*** -1.7529*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
      Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 35.   Probit Intensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability 
of Living within School District Boundaries (Albany) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) 
      Num_SchoolAge 0.0610*** 
 

























-0.1703** -0.3101*** -0.2038** 
 
  
(0.0688) (0.0722) (0.0811) 
 Ehispanic -0.0669 -0.0640 -0.0669 -0.0646 -0.0649 
 
(0.0570) (0.0572) (0.0572) (0.0572) (0.0570) 
Eblack 0.2220*** 0.2343*** 0.2338*** 0.2329*** 0.2308*** 
 
(0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0494) 
Easian -0.0608 -0.0593 -0.0598 -0.0587 -0.0580 
 
(0.1136) (0.1146) (0.1145) (0.1147) (0.1144) 
Edu 0.0917*** 0.0878*** 0.0887*** 0.0884*** 0.0890*** 
 
(0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0216) 
YearsSvc 0.0503*** 0.0533*** 0.0522*** 0.0523*** 0.0518*** 
 
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
X_EDU -0.0121 -0.0087 -0.0180 -0.0087 -0.0049 
 
(0.1892) (0.1890) (0.1887) (0.1890) (0.1893) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - - 
      Constant -3.3117*** -3.3247*** -3.3229*** -3.3240*** -3.3229*** 
 
(0.0381) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0384) 
      Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 














Table 36.    Probit Extensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability 
of Living within School District Boundaries (Albany) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) 
      SchoolAge 0.1994*** 
 

























-0.2012** -0.3194*** -0.2518*** 
 
  
(0.0787) (0.0781) (0.0841) 
 Ehispanic -0.0705 -0.0683 -0.0706 -0.0699 -0.0714 
 
(0.0568) (0.0573) (0.0571) (0.0572) (0.0571) 
Eblack 0.2220*** 0.2354*** 0.2329*** 0.2322*** 0.2301*** 
 
(0.0494) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0494) 
Easian -0.0589 -0.0584 -0.0595 -0.0568 -0.0572 
 
(0.1138) (0.1147) (0.1146) (0.1147) (0.1143) 
Edu 0.0915*** 0.0876*** 0.0878*** 0.0884*** 0.0899*** 
 
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0216) 
YearsSvc 0.0474*** 0.0530*** 0.0504*** 0.0503*** 0.0497*** 
 
(0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
X_EDU -0.0092 -0.0059 -0.0124 -0.0048 -0.0042 
 
(0.1894) (0.1895) (0.1890) (0.1895) (0.1897) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - - 
      Constant -3.3166*** -3.3283*** -3.3266*** -3.3272*** -3.3260*** 
 
(0.0383) (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0386) (0.0385) 
      Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 37.   Probit Intensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability 
of Living within School District Boundaries (Jacksonville) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) 
            
Num_SchoolAge 0.1578*** 
 

























0.4271*** 0.2343*** 0.5511*** 
 
  
(0.0253) (0.0276) (0.0319) 
 Ehispanic -0.1877*** -0.1878*** -0.1877*** -0.1869*** -0.1880*** 
 
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Eblack -0.0975*** -0.0959*** -0.0959*** -0.0951*** -0.0948*** 
 
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0128) 
Easian -0.4083*** -0.4076*** -0.4077*** -0.4078*** -0.4073*** 
 
(0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0259) 
Edu -0.1012*** -0.1001*** -0.1000*** -0.1006*** -0.1015*** 
 
(0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0072) 
YearsSvc 0.0953*** 0.0962*** 0.0969*** 0.0974*** 0.0961*** 
 
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
X_EDU -0.1994*** -0.2010*** -0.2042*** -0.2004*** -0.1984*** 
 
(0.0395) (0.0397) (0.0398) (0.0397) (0.0396) 
X_SERVICE = o, 0.2698* 0.2943** 0.2918** 0.3012** 0.2841** 
 
(0.1398) (0.1413) (0.1414) (0.1416) (0.1410) 
Constant -1.1752*** -1.1857*** -1.1843*** -1.1871*** -1.1798*** 
 
(0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0094) 
      Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 38.   Probit Extensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability 
of Living within School District Boundaries (Jacksonville) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) 
      SchoolAge 0.5385*** 
 

























0.5562*** 0.1735*** 0.2213*** 
 
  
(0.0268) (0.0277) (0.0343) 
 Ehispanic -0.1921*** -0.1894*** -0.1905*** -0.1920*** -0.1899*** 
 
(0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
Eblack -0.1013*** -0.0956*** -0.0971*** -0.1015*** -0.0967*** 
 
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0128) 
Easian -0.4070*** -0.4074*** -0.4064*** -0.4073*** -0.4064*** 
 
(0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0260) 
Edu -0.0970*** -0.0988*** -0.0969*** -0.0962*** -0.0974*** 
 
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
YearsSvc 0.0856*** 0.0943*** 0.0895*** 0.0863*** 0.0895*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
X_EDU -0.1937*** -0.1992*** -0.1963*** -0.1974*** -0.1952*** 
 
(0.0394) (0.0397) (0.0396) (0.0395) (0.0395) 
X_SERVICE = o, 0.2334* 0.2838** 0.2659* 0.2397* 0.2644* 
 
(0.1388) (0.1414) (0.1407) (0.1391) (0.1407) 
Constant -1.1835*** -1.1897*** -1.1932*** -1.1862*** -1.1928*** 
 
(0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) 
      Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 39.   Probit Intensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability 
of Living within School District Boundaries (Twentynine Palms) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) 
            
Num_SchoolAge 0.0721*** 
 

























0.1597*** 0.0343 0.2576*** 
 
  
(0.0273) (0.0294) (0.0360) 
 Ehispanic 0.0799*** 0.0797*** 0.0796*** 0.0805*** 0.0799*** 
 
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
Eblack -0.1827*** -0.1804*** -0.1806*** -0.1800*** -0.1788*** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0220) 
Easian -0.0471 -0.0454 -0.0461 -0.0451 -0.0461 
 
(0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0343) (0.0342) 
Edu 0.0302*** 0.0306*** 0.0304*** 0.0304*** 0.0293*** 
 
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) 
YearsSvc 0.0467*** 0.0467*** 0.0471*** 0.0475*** 0.0473*** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
X_EDU -0.1875*** -0.1842*** -0.1871*** -0.1835*** -0.1844*** 
 
(0.0666) (0.0666) (0.0667) (0.0665) (0.0665) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - - 
      Constant -2.0480*** -2.0537*** -2.0518*** -2.0546*** -2.0515*** 
 
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
      Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 40.   Probit Extensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability 
of Living within School District Boundaries (Twentynine Palms) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) 
      SchoolAge 0.3100*** 
 

























0.2106*** -0.0043 0.0426 
 
  
(0.0330) (0.0321) (0.0352) 
 Ehispanic 0.0765*** 0.0782*** 0.0776*** 0.0762*** 0.0775*** 
 
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
Eblack -0.1860*** -0.1805*** -0.1812*** -0.1858*** -0.1812*** 
 
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0221) 
Easian -0.0441 -0.0443 -0.0430 -0.0440 -0.0430 
 
(0.0342) (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0343) 
Edu 0.0338*** 0.0318*** 0.0329*** 0.0338*** 0.0329*** 
 
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) 
YearsSvc 0.0395*** 0.0452*** 0.0418*** 0.0396*** 0.0417*** 
 
(0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
X_EDU -0.1794*** -0.1809*** -0.1775*** -0.1789*** -0.1774*** 
 
(0.0666) (0.0667) (0.0667) (0.0666) (0.0667) 
X_SERVICE = o, - - - - - 
      Constant -2.0544*** -2.0563*** -2.0595*** -2.0545*** -2.0595*** 
 
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
      Observations 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 169,216 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 41.   Probit Intensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability 
of Living within School District Boundaries (Hawaii) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) 
            


















-0.1178*** -0.0709*** -0.1548*** 
 
  
(0.0362) (0.0269) (0.0310) 
 Num_Secondary 
  
0.1334*** 0.0420 0.2031*** 
   
(0.0295) (0.0314) (0.0381) 
Ehispanic 0.0631*** 0.0635*** 0.0632*** 0.0630*** 0.0638*** 
 
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
Eblack -0.1153*** -0.1119*** -0.1136*** -0.1137*** -0.1132*** 
 
(0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
Easian 0.2477*** 0.2490*** 0.2491*** 0.2490*** 0.2487*** 
 
(0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308) 
Edu 0.0845*** 0.0840*** 0.0852*** 0.0851*** 0.0849*** 
 
(0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) 
YearsSvc 0.0546*** 0.0550*** 0.0544*** 0.0548*** 0.0551*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
X_EDU -0.0467 -0.0438 -0.0433 -0.0461 -0.0422 
 
(0.0698) (0.0698) (0.0699) (0.0700) (0.0699) 
X_SERVICE = o, 0.1263 0.1306 0.1309 0.1301 0.1336 
 
(0.2875) (0.2872) (0.2873) (0.2876) (0.2871) 
Constant -2.2902*** -2.2934*** -2.2952*** -2.2937*** -2.2959*** 
 
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0144) 
      Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   Asterisks denote levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 42.   Probit Extensive Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability 
of Living within School District Boundaries (Hawaii) 
VARIABLES Column(1) Column(2) Column(3) Column(4) Column(5) 


















-0.2269*** -0.1338*** -0.2238*** 
 
  
(0.0343) (0.0332) (0.0331) 
 Secondary 
  
0.1943*** 0.0148 0.0463 
   
(0.0358) (0.0340) (0.0367) 
Ehispanic 0.0598*** 0.0611*** 0.0614*** 0.0610*** 0.0595*** 
 
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
Eblack -0.1190*** -0.1143*** -0.1137*** -0.1144*** -0.1191*** 
 
(0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0241) 
Easian 0.2503*** 0.2517*** 0.2495*** 0.2517*** 0.2502*** 
 
(0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308) 
Edu 0.0881*** 0.0878*** 0.0864*** 0.0879*** 0.0883*** 
 
(0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) 
YearsSvc 0.0477*** 0.0496*** 0.0530*** 0.0496*** 0.0478*** 
 
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
X_EDU -0.0391 -0.0363 -0.0407 -0.0364 -0.0392 
 
(0.0696) (0.0698) (0.0700) (0.0698) (0.0697) 
X_SERVICE = o, 0.1021 0.1133 0.1255 0.1134 0.1033 
 
(0.2898) (0.2891) (0.2881) (0.2891) (0.2897) 
Constant -2.2969*** -2.3025*** -2.2985*** -2.3025*** -2.2971*** 
 
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
      Observations 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 169,346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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